PLAYING BOTH SIDES?
COMMENTS
This is for Action Research Forum of public wisdom;
Playing both sides?
“Understanding dynamics…”
The authors have put their hands in an intricate (n * n) of international relationships, which is blanket of all n^2 relationships and multiplicity of n dimensional furthered by variety of mindsets and events, rather may be prescribed (n * n * n) variant dynamics model.
My country leaderships Uniform or Civilian (now democratic holdup) were little less than what is minimum knowledge base required for such intricacies (over simplified version are their slate of mind) and media so more3 concerned ‘You did and I did’ as there fundamentals without remarkable research and analysis. The forum may form opinion; We are so lucky that superimposed prejudices are over and above, since the beginning of the beginning a delusional Pakistan without any roadmap. Some of uniformed leaders were hardly literate to military science, and aims of objectives of their efforts were 2 + 2 = 4 not two cubes make eight, One of the One Unit education Minister (Usto) was hardly literate who learnt signature after oath. The results were portrayed in three so called wars or battles with Bharat which consumed all our energies. As usual we never account for our pluses and minuses even after such conflicts, simply prescribe Hajji and Shaheed with color of faith and not on realistic ground ‘Lie is biggest evil’.
The Science and Technology is in quantum leap but you better judge by self where we stand in that chase. The military sciences have gone on fly in complicacies, but for domestic consumption we find media writers who are committed to prove our supremacy (AZEEM). Our public wisdom sees non existing, sometimes “Sword of Ali” on skies, sometimes whimsical mysticism, as vital component.
This forum thinks that the authors better choose the right premises in consonant of our public wisdom, rather boosting expressions as such these are displayed in English to the global community. For instance Elaine Blandor like critics and others are on watch especially after WAT.
Comments may be forgiven – if blue.
Ghazi Salahuddin
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Understanding the dynamics of Pakistan’s relations with the United States has never been easy. To a considerable extent, this perplexity results from the absence of an open and reasoned debate on how our ‘national interest’ should be defined.
Equally mystifying is our ruling establishment’s relationship with extremist and militant elements in the country. While we may not be certain about our strategy in a given situation, we do have some hints about our ‘strategic assets’.
And this week has prompted some sobering thoughts about the choices that have been made by our rulers in the domain of national security as well as diplomacy.
This was the lead headline in an English daily on Thursday: “No more emotional decisions in future”. It was a reference to remarks made by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in the meeting of the federal cabinet. He said: “Our relations with Nato and the US are passing through a critical phase where we need to take critical decisions, keeping in view our strategic importance in the region and our national interests”.
Does this mean that the prime minister is conceding that decisions made in the past were founded more on emotions than on reason? Besides, is this admission also a result of a serious and thoughtful contemplation of the options that we have in restoring our engagement with the United States? Is this, then, a new beginning in the conduct of a more realistic foreign policy?
A new beginning is surely in order. But that will demand honesty and wisdom and a candid appraisal of what our strengths and weaknesses are. Normally, new beginnings are prescribed by major upheavals and events of history. This is not the case in our present circumstances. Yet, we feel constrained to revise our terms of engagement – or re-engagement – with the US and the Nato countries.
It is true that the Salala outrage nearly six months ago called for a resolute response. We had the right to demand a full apology, supplanted by adequate compensation and firm assurances that such an incursion will not be repeated. However, the logical outcome was delayed because of some complications on either side.
Meanwhile, our rulers allowed the popular sentiment against America to rise to a high pitch. After the stoppage of the Nato supplies, parliament added its list of demands, mainly the cessation of drone attacks. The stage was set for the hardliners and we had the spectacle of how Difa-e-Pakistan Council mobilised its forces and launched its ideological assault against the United States.
Now, where has this Difa-e-Pakistan Council come from? This is a hard question to answer, particularly in the context of the resistible rise of extremist and even terrorist elements in the country. The mind really boggles when it ponders over the brutalisation of the Pakistani society at the hands of radical Islamists. Indeed, the very survival of the country seems at stake because of the widespread disruptions caused by militant elements, armed with their primitive passions. Add to this the abysmal quality of governance provided by our civilian rulers.
Irrespective of what happens at the Chicago summit and how the imminent restoration of the Nato supply route is handled by the government, the real issue perhaps is the pervasiveness of the intolerant and militant emotion in our polity. Ever since Pakistan teamed up with the US in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it has repeatedly been accused by its American critics of playing both sides. If there is any substance to this allegation, the consequences are hard to reject – Difa-e-Pakistan being the tip of the iceberg.
Or are we only afflicted, as a nation, with the Orwellian concept of ‘doublethink’: the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind, and accepting both of them.
We may not agree with his analysis but noted columnist David Ignatius has argued in the Washington Post that Pakistan has made a “catastrophic mistake” by not exploiting the opportunity of the presence of a large, US-led army just across the border in Afghanistan to “stabilise a lawless sanctuary full of warlords and terrorists”. Instead, it played “games with these outlaw groups”.
Now that the American forces are about to leave Afghanistan, Ignatius believes that “Pakistan is losing the best chance in its history to gain political control over all of its territory – including the warlike tribal areas along the frontier”.
Even if this argument is deceptive, there is no doubt that we will have to contend with our own demons of extremism and militancy not only in the tribal areas but all across the country. Just look at what is happening in Karachi, so far away from Khyber. The more you think about the recent Lyari operation and what it yielded, the more you are baffled by the ability of our rulers to deal with a situation before it becomes nearly unmanageable.
In fact, you may make a list of disasters that were shaped by easily controllable and incremental developments initially ignored – wilfully? – by our security establishment. Remember Lal Masjid? Or the barbarian reign of the Taliban in Swat? Lyari, of course, is the latest example. How can criminals acquire more lethal arms than the police have without the knowledge of the authorities?
So, when you contemplate the crisis of Pakistan in all its dimensions, the straightforward explanation would be that our rulers, including the ones who dictate our security policies, have lacked the wisdom that was required in our peculiar historical circumstances. Emotions, sometimes fostered through deceptive means, have generally prevailed over reason. It is possible that the prime minister, too, did not put much stress on his mind when he promised “no more emotional decisions in future”.
Emotions, obviously, are stacked against the revival of Nato supplies. But there was this interesting report, again in the Washington Post, that said that Pakistanis “in places high and low” were eagerly awaiting the Nato-contracted trucks to resume their passage into Afghanistan after nearly six months of blockade.
While the government wants to balance its budget, the black marketeers are ready to plunder the trucks and the oil tankers. Traders in a bazaar on the outskirts of Peshawar who were selling looted goods are complaining about their loss of business. Tribal-area militants would also profit because “they get protection money from companies that haul the freight”. The report suggested that the Pakistan Army indirectly controls 30 percent of the Nato oil tanker contracts.
Police and local authorities are said to extract bribes to allow convoys to pass. Even the Taliban, said the report, are a beneficiary. “They get weapons and ammunition when they attack the containers”. Isn’t this another example of playing both sides?
The writer is a staff member. Email: ghazi_salahuddin@hotmail.com
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